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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS

STATE EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS AFFORDED QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY IN SUITS MAINTAINED UNDER SECTION

1983.
Scheuer v. Rhodes (U.S. 1974)
1

Petitioners were the individual representatives of the estates of those
students killed in the confrontation with Ohio National Guardsmen at Kent
State University in May, 1970. They sued in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio under section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (section 1983)2 seeking damages from the Governor of Ohio,
certain officers of the Ohio National Guard, and others.3 The complaints
alleged that the defendants, acting under color of state law, "intentionally,
recklessly, wilfully, and wantonly" violated the decedents' constitutional
rights by ordering the Guardsmen onto the Kent State campus, which
precipitated the fatal shootings.4 The district court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
stating that the eleventh amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity5
barred suits by private citizens seeking to hold a state liable for damages.6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed this decision, and held alternatively that the common law doc1. Three separate suits were filed in the district court. On appeal from the dismissal of all three suits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
finding common questions of law in issue, heard the three appeals as companion cases.
Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972). The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in two of these actions: Scheuer v. Rhodes and Krause v. Rhodes,
413 U.S. 919 (1973).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234 (1974). The petitioners' complaints
named as defendants the Governor of Ohio, Adjutant General and Assistant Adjutant
General of the Ohio National Guard, three officers in the Ohio National Guard, various
unnamed members of the Ohio National Guard and the president of Kent State University. Id.
4. Id. at 235.
5. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State .
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

. ..

6. 416 U.S. at 234. The district court opinion is unreported.
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trine of executive immunity shielded the defendants from personal liabiltiy
7
for acts performed within their official capacities.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded,
holding 1) that the district court had improperly granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss" since the eleventh amendment does not bar an action
against a state official who has, under color of state law, deprived a citizen
of a constitutionally conferred right, 9 and 2) that the personal immunity
to liability afforded to state executive officials in section 1983 suits is not
absolute but qualified, the extent of the immunity being dependent upon
the nature of the particular office as well as the reasonableness and good
faith of the official's belief that the challenged conduct was necessary.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
From the outset, it should be noted that the Scheuer Court's narrow
task was to determine whether state executive officials could properly
claim absolute personal immunity to liability in section 1983 suits. In
order to evaluate the rationale of the Scheuer decision, it is first necessary
to examine both the Congressional purpose in enacting section 1983 and
the prior case law dealing with personal immunity as applied to state
officials in the judicial and legislative, as well as executive, branches
of government.
The remedial purpose of section 1983 seems clear :10 to afford private
citizens a federal forum in which to seek redress for the deprivation by
state officials of their constitutional and federal statutory rights.' On its
7. 471 F.2d at 442.
8. The Supreme Court did not intimate a view as to the merits of the case.
It noted that the only documentation before the district court, in addition to the complaints, were two proclamations issued by the defendant Governor of Ohio. The
first proclamation ordered the Ohio National Guard to quell disturbances that had
arisen as a result of truckers' strikes; the remaining proclamation described the conditions existing at Kent State University at that time. While these documents placed
certain questions of fact in issue, the sole issue before the Court was whether executive
officials were absolutely immune from section 1983 suits. 416 U.S. at 232.
9. Id. at 238. The Supreme Court neatly resolved the eleventh amendment
question by finding that upon the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the district court's limited task was to order dismissal only where "'it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.'" Id. at 236, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957) (footnote omitted).
The Court held that under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the district
court's dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity was erroneous, since the petitioners' claims could be construed as seeking to impose personal liability upon the
named defendants as individuals, rather than as seeking recovery against the State
of Ohio. Consequently, the petitioners were entitled to introduce evidence in order to
substantiate their asserted claims. 416 U.S. at 236-38.
10. The purpose of section 1983 was evident from the title of the legislation:
"An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for Other Purposes." Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13.
11. For a discussion of the conditions that led to the enactment of section 1983, see
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1961). In Monroe, a family sued for damages
under section 1983, naming as defendants 13 Chicago police officers who had allegedly
conducted an illegal search and seizure in violation of the individual members of the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss4/5
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face, the statute seems applicable to state officials in all three branches of
government. 1 2 However, when faced with the question as to whether
section 1983 subjected state legislators and judges to civil liability, the
Supreme Court concluded in separate decisions that the statute was not
intended to override the considerations that had originally justified the
1
In
common law grant of absolute immunity to such state officials.'
14
did
1983
Tenney v. Brandhove, the Supreme Court held that section
not abolish state legislators' common law immunity to liability for acts per15 The Court
formed within the scope of legitimate legislative concerns.
reasoned that since Congress had historically viewed legislative freedom
and flexibility as of critical importance to the democratic scheme of government, it would have expressly stated that legislators were personally liable
in section 1983 suits had it so intended. 16 Applying the same rationale,
the Court, in Pierson v. Ray, 17 held that section 1983 had not been intended by Congress to abolish the common law absolute immunity of the
judiciary.' 8 Concomitantly, the Pierson Court observed that one segment
of the executive branch - police officers - had enjoyed no absolute and unqualified immunity at common law, and therefore was precluded from
claiming absolute immunity to liability under section 1983.19 Thus,
these minor executive officials could shield themselves from liability only
20
by demonstrating that they had acted reasonably and in good faith.
While the application of the immunity doctrine varies depending upon
the nature of the officials sought to be insulated from liability, 21 at common
law immunity of state officials was recognized as necessary to ensure the
performance by officials of their duties without fear of exposing themfamily's fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 169. After examining the Congressional
debates dealing with section 1983, the Court held that the lower court had improperly
dismissed the case, and concluded that Congress intended that state officials who acted
under authority of state law be held personally liable, through the vehicle of section
1983, for abuse of their authority resulting in deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights. Id. at 172-74. The Supreme Court noted subsequently, however, that
"Monroe v. Pape presented no question of immunity . . . and none was decided."
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556 (1967).
12. As the Second Circuit observed in Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.
1966): "The Civil Rights Acts in general, and section 1983 in particular, are cast
in terms so broad as to suggest that in suits brought under these sections common
law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar." Id. at 133.
13. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
14. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
15. Id. at 376.
16. Id.
17. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
18. Id. at 554-55.
19. Id. at 555.
20. Id. at 557.
21. One writer has noted that formulating a doctrine of official immunity entails
a balance between "providing a remedy against public officials for tortious conduct and
protecting public officials from both unwarranted harassment and the inhibition that
would occur if the courts passed judgment on the policy decisions of a co-equal branch
of government." See Comment, Carter v. Carlson: The Monroe Doctrine at Bay, 58
Published
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
145 (1972).
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selves to suits by private individuals. 22 According to Professor Jaffe, 3
this doctrine of immunity was based upon two fundamental premises:
First, it was deemed unjust to impose liability upon a public officer who
is legally required to formulate and implement decisions using his personal
discretion (the injustice rationale) ; Second, it was feared that an official
confronted with the threat of personal liability would be dangerously
deterred from executing the duties of his office with the conviction and
decisiveness demanded by the public interest (the danger rationale) .24
While these rationales justified the extension of absolute immunity to
legislators and judges at common law, 25 they had never been sufficiently
persuasive to command the same protection for executive officials. 26
Prior to Scheuer, the Supreme Court had never squarely faced the
issue of whether a state's highest executive officials could claim absolute
immunity in order to escape liability under section 1983. Consequently,
the facts presented in Scheuer required the Court to decide this issue as
one of first impression.
The Scheuer Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger, 27 recognized that the sole issue presented was whether absolute
immunity for state executive officials existed under section 1983.28 Commencing its analysis with an historical overview, 29 the Court noted that
one basic policy consideration lay at the core of the doctrine of immunity,

22. 416 U.S. at 239. The Court noted that official immunity originated in the 16th
and 17th centuries. Id. at 239 n.4, citing Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
23. See note 24 infra.
24. For a general discussion of the injustice and danger rationales as they apply
to official immunity, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 223-24 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe].
25. 416 U.S. at 240-41. In this regard, the Scheuer Court pointed to the Constitution's speech or debate clause which provides in pertinent part: "For any Speech
or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned
in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The Court also mentioned the fact that
the principles embodied in that provision had been well established in the States prior
to the adoption of the Constitution. 416 U.S. at 241 n.6. See generally Suarez,
Congressioinal Immunity: A Criticism of Existing Distinctions and a Proposal for
a New Definitional Approach, 20 VTLL. L. REV. 97 (1974).
With respect to judicial immunity, in the leading case of Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), the Supreme Court, in a fact situation antedating the
enactment of section 1983, denied recovery in an attorney's action against a District
of Columbia judge. The Bradley Court recognized that the principle of absolute
judicial immunity "has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country."
Id. at 347.
26. For a general discussion of the factors that should be considered in deciding
upon the appropriateness of absolute or qualified immunity, see Keefe, Personal Tort
Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAm L. REV. 130, 131-32 (1943).
27. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
28. 416 U.S. at 242. The Court specifically stated that since the only issue was
the propriety of the lower court's ruling granting the defendants' motion to dismiss,
Scheuer presented "no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity
available to state executive officials," nor did it "permit a determination as to the
applicability of the [principles enunciated] to the respondents here." Id. at 249.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss4/5
29. Id. at 239-41.
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namely, that unfettered decisionmaking and action on the part of government officials are essential to the maintenance of the public welfare.8 0
Thus, while a grant of immunity to government officials entails a risk
that some injuries may remain unredressed, more importantly, it tends to
ensure that public officials will not be deterred from making necessary
31
decisions and taking needed action.
Turning next to an examination of section 1983, the Court noted that
the statute contained no specific language which could be construed to
afford absolute immunity to the entire class of government officials.8 2 On
the other hand, the Court noted that the Tenney and Pierson decisions had
held that in the absence of a statutory provision expressly abolishing the
well-established common law immunities of state officials both judges and
legislators were not precluded from invoking those immunities in suits
brought under section 1983.33 In order to determine whether the rationales

of Tenney and Pierson could logically be extended to executive officials,
the Scheuer Court's preliminary task was to decide whether there had
existed at common law a privilege of executive immunity which section
1983, by its silence, might have left undisturbed.
The Court initially focused upon the Pierson decision, wherein it was
recognized that police officers had never enjoyed an absolute and unqualified immunity at common law.8 4 Nevertheless, Pierson had also held
that, in order to ensure that police officers would not be unduly dissuaded
from performing their duties, they must be permitted to assert the common
law defenses of good faith belief and probable cause to act, in seeking to
avoid liability under section 1983.35

While the Scheuer Court observed

30. Id. at 241.
31. Id. at 242.
32. Id. at 243. The Court quoted from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
wherein the Supreme Court noted that section 1983 was intended "to give a remedy
to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's
abuse of his position." 416 U.S. at 243, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172
(1961). See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). See also Note,
Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1486, 1489 (1969); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1203-04 (1971).
33. 416 U.S. at 243-44. The Court cited Pierson, notes 17-20 and accompanying
text supra, wherein it was noted that "'[t] he legislative record [of section 1983] gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities," 416 U.S. at 243, quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
The Scheuer Court also cited Tenney, notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra,
wherein it was noted that it was "highly improbable that 'Congress - itself a staunch
advocate of legislative freedom - would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in
history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language . . .' [of section 19831."
416 U.S. at 244, quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
34. 416 U.S. at 245, discussing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
35. 416 U.S. at 245, discussing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). The
Pierson Court noted that:
[ulnder the prevailing view in this country a peace officer who arrests someone
with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of
Published the
by Villanova
Charles Widger
School of Law
Digital
1975that he must
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is later proved.
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certain similarities between the function performed by police officers and
those performed by higher executive officials, 36 it stated that the inherent
differences between the types of functions ordinarily performed by each
of these officials8 7 necessitated the adoption of a flexible test to determine
the scope of immunity to which higher executive officials are entitled. 38
The Court reasoned that because the options available to a chief executive
are far more numerous and less readily apparent than those available to
minor executive officials, higher executive officials merit a broader range
of discretion. 39

As a result, the Court formulated

the following test:

[In
varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers in
the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of the discretion and responsibilities of the office and

all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the
40
action on which liability is sought to be based.
Having resolved in the negative the narrow issue of whether executive
officials

could claim absolute

immunity

under

section

1983 suits,

the

Scheuer Court concluded its analysis by noting that had the Court decided
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when
he has probable cause and being mulcted in damages if he does.

386 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). See W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

§ 26 (4th ed. 1971).
36. 416 U.S. at 246. The Scheuer Court noted that both lower and upper echelon
executive officials
must often act swiftly and firmly at the risk that action deferred will be futile
or constitute virtual abdication of office. . . . [Both] are entitled to rely on
traditional sources for the factual information on which they decide and act. When
a condition of civil disorder in fact exists, there is obvious need for prompt action,
and decisions must be made in reliance on factual information supplied by others.
Id. at 246 (citation omitted).
37. The Court recognized the essential difference between a policeman's daily
decisions - usually involving the question of whether to arrest - and those decisions
customarily made by the governor of a state - usually involving questions concerning
the formulation of state policy, legislative measures and budgetary schemes. Id. at 246.
38. Id. at 247.
39. Id. The Scheuer Court's decision to examine upon a relative basis the range
of decisions committed to a particular segment of the executive branch reiterated an
approach taken by the Court in an earlier case, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
While not a section 1983 action, the observations articulated in Barr were deemed by
the Scheuer Court to be pertinent to its analysis:
"To be sure, the occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive
department will be protected by the privilege are doubtless far broader than in
the case of an officer with less sweeping functions. But that is because the higher
the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the
scope of discretion, it entails. It is not the title of his office but the duties with
which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted ... which must provide the guide. .. ."
416 U.S. at 247, quoting Barr v. Matteo, supra at 573 (citations omitted).
40. 416 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added). The Court restated the qualified immunity
test in the following manner:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss4/5
official conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
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that state executive officials were absolutely immune to section 1983
41
liability, it would have virtually drained that provision of its meaning.
While initially it would appear that the same policy considerations
which led the Supreme Court to extend to legislative and judicial officials
absolute immunity from section 1983 actions could have applied to executive
officials as well, 42 the fact that after Scheuer only state executive officials
can be held accountable under section 1983 for their official acts demands
that the Scheuer rationale and its probable impact be carefully examined.
For the Scheuer Court to have rested its decision, in part, upon the
consideration that a contrary holding would have rendered section 1983
"drained of meaning," 43 was somewhat misleading. Indeed, it is questionable whether the Court assumed the proper approach in feeling obligated to rescue section 1983 from the fate of meaninglessness by thrusting
that statute's full impact upon the executive branch. Notwithstanding
the Court's holdings in Tenney and Pierson,44 the plain and unambiguous
language of section 1983 purports to apply, not simply to persons who
were not immune to liability at common law, but, rather, to "every person"
who, under color of state law, deprived a citizen of constitutional or federal
rights. 45 Thus, by designating the executive branch as the only remaining
41. Id. at 248. In support of this proposition, the Court also cited an earlier
case, Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), wherein the Governor of Texas
had contended that the district court had no authority to review the sufficiency of the
facts upon which martial law had been declared and that such executive action was
conclusive and exempt from judicial review. Id. at 397. The Sterling Court noted
that a state chief executive's broad peacekeeping discretion will not support every
action officially taken, particularly where the constitutional rights of private citizens
are thereby jeopardized. Id. at 397-98. Thus, the Sterling Court held that although
great deference should be given to the official's determination that the action was
appropriate under the circumstances, the presumption in favor of the conduct taken
is rebuttable. Id. at 399.
The Scheuer Court distinguished another case that had arisen out of the Kent
State incident, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). In Gilligan, the students had
sought to restrain the Governor of Ohio and National Guard officers from ordering
the deployment of troops in the future where such action would result in violations of
the students' first and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 3. While holding the
plaintiffs' claim to be nonjusticiable for the reason that it called upon the court to

assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the National Guard,
the Gilligan Court noted:
[W]e neither hold nor imply that the conduct of the National Guard is always
beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum
for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether
by way of damages or injunctive relief.
Id. at 11-12.
42. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra. Even though the common law
had expressly granted absolute immunity from suit to judges and legislators, the injustice and danger rationales that underlay the doctrine of immunity would appear
to be equally applicable to officials in the executive branch. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
43. 416 U.S. at 248.
44. See notes 14-16 & 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
45. For the language of the section, see note 2 supra. With respect to the
propriety
of the Court's
holding
Pierson
(seeofnote
supra),
it has 1975
been forcefully
Published
by Villanova
University
CharlesinWidger
School
Law 33
Digital
Repository,
contended by some, notably Justice Douglas in his Pierson dissent, that no exemption

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 5

1064

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20

target of section 1983, the Scheuer Court ignored the fact that Tenney
and Pierson were the cases chiefly responsible for drastically narrowing
the coverage of section 1983.
If the rationale that executive officials were denied the absolute immunity accorded legislators and judges because to do so would have
rendered section 1983 a nullity does nqt satisfactorily explain the Scheuer
Court's distinction between the treatment given legislators and judges on
the one hand, and that given executive officials on the other, then it may be
reasonable to conclude that the Scheuer holding was a result of the Court's
perception of factors peculiar to executive conduct. It has been suggested
that, despite the possibility that legislative or judicial conduct may result
in the deprivation of an individual's constitutional or federal statutory
rights, such injuries often can be redressed by resorting to the very machinery which inflicted the harm because these officials remain constantly
subject to supervision by their own kind or the public. 46 However, it has
been observed that an injury caused by an executive official often cannot be redressed by any means other than an action for damages. 47 Thus,
the limited recourse available to injured citizens for unlawful executive
action justifies, to some extent, the distinction made in the Scheuer decision. While this argument is appealing, it should be noted that the
for judges was intended by the drafters of that statute, particularly in light of the
statutory language which refers to "every person." As Justice Douglas noted, "To
most, every person would mean every person, not every person except judges." 386
U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis by the Court). Apparently, the
legislative history of section 1983 is susceptible to a meaning other than that drawn
by the majority in Pierson. Arguably, to exempt legislators and judges from liability
under section 1983 "ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke to
the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and that judges
[and presumably legislators] would be liable." Id. at 561.
One commentator took a similar view before Pierson was decided. See Note,
The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1296 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Proper Scope]. See generally Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Liability].
46. See Note, Proper Scope, supra note 45, at 1297-98. A person injured by
legislative action can, theoretically, obtain redress through the legislative process
by means of lobbying or referendum. Responsive legislative officials, persuaded by
pleas of aggrieved individuals or of public interest groups, might feel impelled to
undo the ill effects of a statute either by amending or repealing it. Similarly, a person
injured by judicial action can obtain relief within the judicial process by appealing
to a higher court. One writer has suggested that the extension of absolute immunity
to only legislative and judicial officials is justifiable since those officers are so directly
concerned with questions of due process, equal protection, and other rights protected
by section 1983. Id. at 1296.
The viability of the foregoing argument is open to question insofar as it
assumes that the self-supervision of the legislative and judicial branches is likely to
afford the desired relief. Resorting to the political process for redress for injury
resulting from a legislator's conduct is a time-consuming and highly unpredictable
process at best. Similarly, judicial review of allegedly injurious judicial conduct, even
if the error is corrected, may yield relief too late. See Note, Liability, supra note 45,
at 329-30. Hence, from a practical standpoint, the mere existence of intralegislative
and intrajudicial supervision may be of little benefit to the injured citizen.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss4/5
47. Note, Proper Scope, supra note 45, at 1298.
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Scheuer opinion in no way indicated whether the Court had intended to
justify the differing immunities accorded the several branches of government based upon that argument.
The Scheuer decision posits that the traditional bases underlying
absolute immunity, 48 which the common law granted to both legislative
and judicial officials, 49 do not apply with equal force to executive officials.
Stated in Professor Jaffe's terms,50 Scheuer stands for the proposition
that it is neither unjust to the official nor dangerous to the public to expose
state executive officials to the threat of liability under section 1983. "11
Unfortunately, the Scheuer Court never advanced the reasons why the
injustice and danger rationales operate differently in the context of official
executive conduct, other than by simply repeating the finding made in
Pierson that the "common law has never granted police officers an absolute
and unqualified immunity." 52 On the other hand, Scheuer affirmatively
underscored the desirability of an immunity rationale designed to ensure
that executive officials, no less than legislators and judges, perform their
duties diligently.53 A subsequent Supreme Court decision sheds light upon
48. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
49. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
50. See Jaffe, supra note 24, at 223-24.
51. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pierson, felt
not only that the language of section 1983 had subjected judges to liability (see note 45
supra), but also, that exposing judges to section 1983 liability would not cause them
to "'fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and
consciences.' " 386 U.S. at 565, quoting Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94,
110 (1869) (Cockburn, C.J., dissenting). In response to the Pierson majority's
assertion that the imposition of civil liability upon judges would lead to intimidation,
386 U.S. at 554, Justice Douglas further stated, "Congress, I think, concluded that
the evils of allowing intentional, knowing deprivations of civil rights to go nnredressed far outweighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry
into a judicial deprivation of civil rights." Id. at 567.
52. 416 U.S. at 245, quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). The nere
fact that the common law traditionally permitted suits to be brought against police
officers does illuminate the reasons for that tradition.
53. For example, the Scheuer Court acknowledged that all "public officials,
whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions
when they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made
do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices." 416 U.S. at 242 (citation omitted). The Court cited Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), wherein it
was held that the Postmaster General of the United States, as well as heads of other
executive departments, could not be held liable in a suit for damages for official communications made in the course of their official duties. Id. at 498. The Scheuer
opinion quoted the following portion of Spalding:
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department,
keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension
that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the
subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch
of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."
416 U.S. at 242 n.7, quoting Spalding v. Vilas, supra at 498.
Spalding was subsequently quoted by the Scheuer Court for the proposition that
same general
considerations
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convenience1975
which demand
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the rationale for distinguishing legislators and judges from executives.
In Wood v. Strickland,54 public school board members named as defendants in a section 1983 suit for damages were permitted to invoke a qualified
immunity in accordance with a test similar to the Scheuer test.55 After

reasoning that both common law tradition and strong public policy required that section 1983 be construed to afford some measure of immunity
to public school officials, 50 the Wood Court stated that a grant of absolute
immunity "would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to
exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of
a remedy for students subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable
deprivations. '57 Applying this language to the result reached in Scheuer,
it can be seen that the Scheuer Court felt it to be undesirable to foreclose
the possibility of redress against executive officials for violations of section
1983, especially since to do so would not impel executive officials to be
any more vigilant in performing their duties.58
The qualified immunity test announced by the Scheuer Court potentially subjects any executive official charged with a violation of section
1983 to liability. By taking into account "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office," 59 and thus, applying a sliding scale standard,
the Court adopted an approach to executive liability that was not unprecedented. 0 Nevertheless, the Court has left the lower federal courts with
little guidance in resolving extraordinarily difficult factual situations, since
it merely prescribed that an inquiry be made into the nature of the office 0'
and described the test to be simply a "more complex" version of the
2
good faith-probable cause test applied to policemen.
them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large
extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments ....
The interests of the people require that due protection be accorded to them in
respect of their official acts."
416 U.S. at 246 n.8, quoting Spalding v. Vilas, supra at 498. It has been noted that
Spalding did not lay down a sweeping rule of immunity. See Jennings, Tort Liability
of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 274 n.44 (1937).

54. 420 U.S.308 (1975).
55. Id. at 318.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 320.
58. It is submitted that both the Scheuer and Wood decisions neglected to consider an additional factor that might have warranted the extension of absolute immunty to both executive officials and school officials. That is, the availability of
absolute immunity for legislators and judges may be determined upon a motion to
dismiss, thus avoiding the necessity of expending time and effort, in defending a suit
brought solely for harassment, that might otherwise be channeled into the performance
of governmental responsibilities. That the public would derive equal benefit in this
respect by immunizing higher executive officials from suit is self-evident.
59. 416 U.S. at 247.
60. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. The Scheuer Court stated:
"[S]ince the options which a chief executive and his principal subordinates must
consider are far broader and far more subtle than those made by officials with less
responsibility, the range of discretion must be comparably broad." 416 U.S. at 247.
61. Id., citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 573-74. See note 39 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss4/5
62. 416 U.S. at 246.
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The Scheuer test appears to be an improvement over the discretionaryministerial test, 3 in which an executive official's susceptibility to suit depended upon the characterization of the injury-producing act as "discretionary" or "ministerial." 64 After Scheuer, however, the problem remains
as to whether the finder of fact, who may be able to analyze whether a
police officer acted reasonably in making an arrest, possesses equal competence to determine whether the governor of a state, whose official act
gave rise to the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional right, acted reasonably and in good faith so as to afford a basis for executive immunity. 5
Perhaps the most significant impact of the Scheuer holding is the
possibility that higher executive officials, including the chief executive of
a state, may be required to pay exorbitant sums of money, as damages, to
a successful section 1983 plaintiff, in the event that such official is found
63. The discretionary-ministerial test denied recovery to private citizens in suits
against officials when the act giving rise to the alleged injury was committed in the
exercise of the official's discretionary power. Conversely, where the act was performed
in the exercise of the official's ministerial power, recovery was permitted. For excellent discussions of the discretionary-ministerial distinction as a basis for official
immunty, see Jaffe, supra note 24; Jennings, supra note 53. See also Note, 20 VILL.
L. REv. 630, 632-33 (1974-75).
64. There has been considerable criticism of the discretionary-ministerial test,
as to both the means and results of its application. One writer observed that "early
case law reveals futile attempts to ascertain which of the chameleon-like functions are
inherently discretionary and which are inherently ministerial." Comment, supra note
21, at 145. Professor Jaffe noted that the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy is "a
convenient device for extending the area of nonliability without making the reasons
explicit." Jaffe, supra note 24, at 218. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Jennings, supra note 53.
Professor Jaffe further noted that an approach to the concept of official immunity, phrased strictly in terms of discretionary power, fails to isolate and balance
those factors which require consideration, including:
the character and severity of the plaintiff's injury, the existence of alternative
remedies, the capacity of a court or jury to evaluate the propriety of the officer's
action, and the effect of liability whether of the officer or of the treasury on
effective administration of the law.
Jaffe, supra note 24, at 219. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), wherein four
dissenting justices expressed various grounds for dissatisfaction with an official immunity test which looked solely to the nature of the official's act, to the exclusion
of other vital competing interests. Id. at 578-92 (dissenting opinions).
It is submitted that Scheuer, while silent as to the present vitality of the discretionary-ministerial test, has effectively rejected that test as a sole basis for determining official immunity. This proposition is implicit in the formulation of the
Scheuer test which looks not only to whether the act was committed in the exercise
of "discretionary" power, but also to the reasonableness and good faith behind its
commission. Under Scheuer, therefore, both ministerial and discretionary executive
acts could give rise to liability. See Note, supra note 63, at 633.
65. By making the availability of executive immunity dependent, in part, upon
"all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared" to the official "at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based," 416 U.S. at 247, the Scheuer Court
seemed to suggest that a "reasonable executive official" standard be applied. For an
article taking this view, see Note, Official Immunity in Ohio: If You Can't Sue the
King, Sue the King's Men, 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 557, 582 (1974). It should be noted
that under the Scheuer test, even if the finder of fact determines that the executive
officer may not claim immunity, such a determination will not conclusively establish
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to have acted either unreasonably or in bad faith. While the Supreme
Court cases upholding absolute immunity for legislators and judges do
not cite as justification for such immunity the potentially overwhelming
financial liability accompanying an adverse judgment, the Scheuer Court
was not thereby precluded from addressing that issue. Moreover, this
factor was taken into account in Wood, wherein the Court stated that the
potential liability imposed by section 1983 would deter capable people from
assuming school board positions and exercising independent judgment
unless some measure of immunity was granted. 6r This consideration is
even more compelling with respect to executive officials since their conduct
ordinarily affects a portion of the population much broader than simply
school students. In view of the often astronomical judgments sought and
awarded under section 1983, it is submitted that the Scheuer Court should
have considered the potential consequence of imposing personal liability
from a financial as well as a theoretical standpoint.
The Scheuer Court's decision to afford only a qualified immunity to
state executive officials sued under section 1983 renders any and all such
officials potentially liable under that statute, provided the plaintiff's proofs
can establish that the official acted in such a manner as to forfeit any claim
of immunity. By denominating the executive branch as the only remaining
target of section 1983, Scheuer provides that a complaint alleging unreasonable action and/or bad faith on the part of an executive official will at
least withstand a motion to dismiss and thus, ensures that injured plaintiffs
will be afforded the opportunity to have their rights to recovery heard.
This result may seem unreasonably harsh from the standpoint of officials
in the executive branch. However, the harshness is mitigated by the fact
that the Scheuer holding is confined to actions to redress deprivation of
constitutional rights, which in justice and fairness, and in consonance with
the purpose of section 1983, should not be foreclosed simply because it was
an official's indiscretion which caused the act to be committed.
Steven E. Bernstein

66. 420 U.S. at 319-20.
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